Worst Call In Super Bowl History

Photo by Ed Yourdon

I realize that it's hyberbolic to call today's safety call the worst in 46 Super Bowls. But somebody needs to do it. Right now, there are thousands of people out there Googling "worst super bowl call ever", and they need to be able to find something.

On the Patriots' very first play of the game, Brady dropped back in the pocket, couldn't find a receiver, and threw the ball away. The refs called intentional grounding, and awarded a safety because Brady was in the end zone at the time. WTF?!?

This led to 2 points for the Giants, and gave the ball back to New York, leading to another 7 points. The Giants' first 9 points were a direct result of this absurd call.

Brady didn't even throw it out of bounds like he normally does. And he didn't just spike it into the ground like Peyton Manning always does. He threw it 45 yards downfield.

I have never seen intentional grounding called on a 45-yard pass. Never. And I can't find anyone who has.

The average NFL quarterback "throws the ball away" a couple times per game. Peyton Manning and Tom Brady probably do it three or more times each game. Twelve minutes later, Eli chucked it out of bounds under similar conditions. But no grounding call.

I'm not blaming the game per se on that call. The Giants D played well, Manningham made an unbelievable catch, Eli was surprisingly accurate, and Welker couldn't hold on to the most important pass of the game. But that is certainly the worst call I can remember in a Super Bowl.

The offensive pass interference in Super Bowl XL was pretty dubious, but it was a judgment call that the ref had to make in real time. So if the ref see a lot of contact and throws a flag, that's the way the ball bounces. But on today's safety, the refs had all the time in the world to get together and make the right call, and they still blew it. That's the amazing thing. You can't criticize the refs too badly when they have to make a call in real-time on a close play. But when you have the time to get it right, you should get it right!

Considering how bad this call was, I'm surprised that Brady and Belicheck didn't throw a complete hissy fit. But keeping a level head was the right thing to do. NFL rules don't allow for a penalty to be overturned, so it's not worth getting ejected. Also, I think they were just stunned at seeing a call that has never been called in the history of the league.

Cris Collinsworth, in an attempt I assume to quell any controversy, did point out that the referee's call matched the rules in the rulebook: Brady was under pressure, in the pocket, and in the end zone. But he sounded surprised as he made this argument. As in "I've never seen this call before, but I'm being told that this counts as intentional grounding according to the letter of the rules."

Photo by Abqtrucker on flickr

Of course, Collinsworth and everyone outside New York knew it wasn't intentional grounding. It was just another QB throwing the ball away when he can't find someone open -- something that Peyton Manning and Tom Brady have been doing for 10 years (and a skill that has helped pave their way to Canton). If Eli Manning had made the same throw I wouldn't have been screaming for intentional grounding. It wouldn't have even have occurred to me. Instead, I would have been commending Eli for his poise in the pocket, and getting ready for 2nd down.

I have seen worse calls in the playoffs. But I haven't seen a worse call in the Super Bowl. Perhaps this is payback for "The Tuck Rule". By all common sense, Brady fumbled the ball in that game. But according to the rulebook, it was incomplete. So, this call was the same thing. Everyone knew it wasn't intentional grounding, but the refs chose this one play to apply the rulebook as written (and then ignore that section of the rulebook for the rest of the Super Bowl).

"Throwing the ball away" is so common in the NFL that we have a phrase for it. If every time you "threw the ball away" you were called for intentional grounding, we wouldn't call it "throwing the ball away"; we would call it "intentional grounding". And we wouldn't have every talking head on ESPN heaping praise on every QB who chucks the ball out of bounds instead of trying to force a play downfield.

Heck, even Madden even has a player rating called "Throw The Ball Away" that specifies whether a QB is more likely to thow an intentional incompletion or try to make something happen. And, as we already knew, Tom Brady and Peyton Manning have high ratings in this area.

As an NFL fan, I would like to see intentional grounding called more often. The defense should be rewarded for getting pressure on the QB. But you don't all-of-a-sudden decide to start calling this penalty in the last and most important game of the season.

Related post: Worst Ad In Super Bowl History?

Super Bowl MVP Predictions

Photo by Keith Allison

As mentioned on Sunday, we used Football Mogul to predicts the results of Super Bowl XLVI by simulating the game 100,000 times. We also recorded the MVP of each game.

Odds are that it will go to a quarterback. But there's a 48.7% chance of someone else taking home the MVP trophy.

Player	MVP Chance
Tom Brady (NE)	31.6%
Eli Manning (NYG)	19.7%
Wes Welker (NE)	5.9%
Rob Gronkowski (NE)	5.7%
Aaron Hernandez (NE)	4.7%
Victor Cruz (NYG)	4.6%
Hakeem Nicks (NYG)	4.1%
Ahmad Bradshaw (NYG)	3.4%
BenJarvus Green-Ellis (NE)	3.4%
Deion Branch (NE)	2.6%
Jason Pierre-Paul (NYG)	2.1%
Vince Wilfork (NE)	1.2%
Brandon Jacobs (NYG)	1.8%
Mario Manningham (NYG)	1.4%
Jerod Mayo (NE)	0.9%
Justin Tuck (NYG)	0.9%
Osi Umenyiora (NYG)	0.8%
Kyle Arrington (NE)	0.7%
Antrel Rolle (NYG)	0.6%
Lawrence Tynes (NYG)	0.5%
Devin McCourty (NE)	0.5%
Danny Woodhead (NE)	0.4%
Chad Ochocinco (NE)	0.3%
Jake Ballard (NYG)	0.3%
Stephen Gostkowski (NE)	0.3%
Stephen Hoyer (NE)	0.2%

Note: This simulation assumed that Gronkowski is at 90% because of a high ankle sprain. If he's 100% healthy, his chance to win the MVP will be higher than Wes Welker's.

I'm amused by the 1-in-500 chance that Brady gets injured and Hoyer leads the Pats to their 4th Super Bowl victory.

I'm a bit surprised that Julian Edelman didn't make the list, as the only guy that's playing on offense, defense and special teams. He could conceivably get a receiving TD, a return TD, and a "Pick 6".

Related article: Football Mogul Predicts Super Bowl XLVI

The NFL's "Worst" Pass Defenses

In tonight's 45-7 drubbing of the Broncos by the Patriots, I have to admit that the 2nd half was pretty boring.

Here's what I did see that was interesting:

CBS put up a graphic showing that the best teams in the NFL this year also had the worst pass defenses. This wasn't the first time I had seen this stat trotted out as "proof" that the Packers, Saints and Pats have horrible pass defenses.

Team	Won	Lost	Pass Yards Allowed Per Game	NFL Rank
Green Bay Packers	15	1	301.2	32nd
New England Patriots	13	3	283.0	31st
New Orleans Saints	11	5	266.7	30th

Well ... duh.

Teams that win most of their games are often playing with the lead. That means that their opponents are playing from behind. Teams trying to catch up have to pass more. And teams that pass more get more pass yards.

Furthermore, these three teams have the three best QBs in the NFL. With Brady, Brees and Rodgers leading your passing attack, it doesn't take very long to score. And teams that pass use up less time on the clock. That gives opponents of these teams even more opportunity to rack up passing yards.

The problem with Passing Yards is that it's an absolute stat, not a rate stat. So circumstances that cause a team to pass more will make it look like they are "better" passing teams.

To show that good teams allow more passing yards, I took the free version of Football Mogul and created a universe where every team had the exact same players on defense. And then I used the "Simulator Tool" to simulate the 2011-2012 one hundred times, to look at the impact that a team's offense has on their passing yards allowed:

Team	Wins	Pass Yards Allowed Per Game
Great Teams	13 - 16	259.7
Good Teams	10 - 12	257.2
Average Teams	7 - 9	244.3
Bad Teams	4 - 6	240.1
Horrible Teams	0 - 3	241.6

As you can see, the better teams allow more passing yards. Using passing yards allowed to measure a football defense is like using double plays to measure a baseball defense. Counterintuitively, bad teams turn more double plays, simply because they allow more base runners, and you need someone on base to turn a double play.

If the talking heads really wanted the truth, they would show this:

Team	Won	Lost	Opponent Passer Rating	NFL Rank
Green Bay Packers	15	1	82.2	11th
New England Patriots	13	3	84.7	16th
New Orleans Saints	11	5	88.1	24th

Alas, saying that the Patriots have an "average passing defense" doesn't make for eye-catching on-screen graphics. So for now we'll have to continue to hear about New England's incompetent secondary.

Go For Two!

Photo by Keith Allison

While most New England fans are still recoiling from today's loss to the Jets, I thought I would take a moment to draw your attention to a huge error by coach Belichick that significantly reduced our chance to win the game.


With less than two minutes left in the game, the Patriots scored a touchdown and kicked the extra point, to bring themselves within 7 points of the Jets.

Before the score, the Patriots were down 31-17. It's pretty clear at this point in the game that the only way the Patriots could win is to score two touchdowns while preventing the Jets from scoring.

So, any assessment of the correct strategy should assume that the Pats will score two touchdowns while holding New York scoreless.

The league average success rate for 2-point conversions is 47.9%. Using this rate, it doesn't make sense to "go for 2" if you can tie the game by kicking the extra point. Here's a quick example of how the math works out in that situation (when the trailing team is behind by just 1 point after scoring the touchdown, but before the point-after):

(PAT success is 98.7%):

1) Team scores touchdown to bring score within 1 point. Team kicks extra point.

Chance of leading after this score: 0%.
Chance of being tied after this score: 98.7%.
Chance of trailing after this score: 1.3%.

2) Team scores touchdown to bring score within 1 point. Team goes for two.

Chance of leading after this score: 47.9%.
Chance of being tied after this score: 0%.
Chance of trailing after this score: 52.1%.

A team that ends the game in the lead wins that game. If they end the game trailing on the scoreboard, they lose. All things being equal, a team that ends the game tied has a 50% chance of winning that game.

So, we can award 1.0 wins for a result that puts the team in the lead; 0.5 wins for a result that ties the game; and 0.0 wins for a result after which the scoring team is still trailing.

Using those values, kicking the extra point produces 0.4935 wins but going for two results in only 0.4790 wins.

However, if the trailing team needs *two* touchdowns, the math is totally different.

1) Team trails by 14 points and scores two touchdowns. Team never goes for two:

Chance of leading after both scores: 0%.
Chance of being tied after both scores: 97.42%.
Chance of trailing after both scores: 2.58%.

2) Team trails by 14 points and goes for two after the first touchdown:

Chance of pulling within 6 points: 47.9%.
Chance of pulling within 7 points: 0%.
Chance of pulling within 8 points: 52.1%.

Then, when the team scores a 2nd time, they kick the extra point *if it would give them the lead*. If the team scored 8 points with the first touchdown, they have already tied the game before kicking the extra point.

2a) Team trails by 6 points before the touchdown, and kicks the extra point:

Chance of leading after both scores: 98.7%.
Chance of being tied after both scores: 1.3%.
Chance of trailing after both scores: 0.0%.

If the two-point conversion failed on the first touchdown, the team has to go for two in an attempt to just tie the game:

2b) Team trails by 8 points before the touchdown, and goes for two:

Chance of leading after this score: 0.0%.
Chance of being tied after this score: 47.9%.
Chance of trailing after this score: 52.1%.

To see the overall chance of winning the game with this strategy (going for two after the first touchdown), we have to combine the odds from 2a and 2b:

2) Team trails by 14 points and goes for two after the first touchdown

Chance of leading after both scores: 47.28%.
Chance of being tied after both scores: 25.58%.
Chance of trailing after both scores: 27.14%.

Assuming a 50% chance of winning tie games, here's what we get:

Going for two after the first score: .6007 wins
Kicking the extra point after the first score: .4866 wins

Going for two after the first score increases the chance to win the game by 23.4%. That's a huge difference (and one that Belichick shouldn't have passed up).

The key is that when you know that you need *two* touchdowns, you can make the decision whether to go for 2 on the second touchdown, *already knowing whether you had a successful conversion on the first touchdown*. If you weren't successful, then you need to go for two to tie the game. But if you succeeded on the first touchdown, you can just kick the extra point on the second touchdown, and win the game by 1 point.

Wes Welker For MVP

Photo by Mike Gil 

Peyton Manning was announced two days ago as the MVP for the 2009 NFL season. But yesterday, without even leaving Bob Kraft's luxury box, Wes Welker proved that he was the one who should have received the award.

With Welker on the roster, the Pats were 7-0 at home this season. Without Welker, they lost in Foxboro to the Ravens, 33-14. It seems silly to pin a 19-point loss on an injury to one guy. But the evidence shows that Wes Welker turns Tom Brady from a "very good" quarterback into "the best quarterback ever".

Brady's career Passer Rating with Welker: 108.1. That's easily the best Passer Rating ever. It's not even close. According to Football Mogul, Steve Young has a career Passer Rating of 96.8. Peyton Manning and his vaunted four MVPs: just 95.2. Take Welker away from Brady and his career Passer Rating drops to 88.7, more than two points behind Chad Pennington!

The difference is just as stark in the playoffs. Brady's Passer Rating in playoff games with Welker is 97.1, including an amazing 70.6% overall completion rate. Without Welker, Brady's playoff Passer Rating is a mediocre 83.2. And the icing on this shit cake is a 49.1 Passer Rating in Sunday's game versus the Ravens.

Julian Edelman caught two touchdowns in Brady's first home playoff loss. But he didn't move the chains like Welker. And he didn't free up Moss to go deep. Brady spent a lot of time holding the ball and getting pressured, because he didn't have Wes to go to when he needed to.

For some final perspective, note that Matt Cassel's season with the Patriots (and with Welker) in 2008 was better than four of Brady's seasons without Welker. But it was worse than the seasons that Brady has had with Welker. So, Brady is better than Cassel. But Wes is better than both of them.

So, my vote for 2009 NFL MVP goes to Wesley Carter Welker. Without Wes, the Patriots may not have even made the playoffs this year. Tell Peyton to give back that trophy!

Belichick Made The Right Call

Photo by Keith Allison

Last night, near the end of an important game against the Indianapolis Colts in Week 10, the New England Patriots faced 4th-and-2 on their own 28-yard-line. The Patriots were ahead by 6 points, with 2 minutes and 8 seconds left on the clock. Conventional wisdom said the Patriots should punt the ball, to force Manning to try to drive the length of the field for a game-winning score. Instead, the Patriots went for it and failed to convert. The Colts went on to win.

Commentators are already arguing about whether Coach Belichick showed too little faith in his defense, or too much faith in his offense. It has nothing do with faith. It's all about giving your team the best chance of winning. And the numbers say that Belichick made the right call.

To assess whether Belichick chose wisely, I used Football Mogul to simulate the situation that the Patriots faced. Football Mogul had access to every detail of the game, including current rosters and playbooks for each team. It even takes into account the weather and wind, and the fatigue level of the New England defense.

Specifically, I simulated the remainder of the game exactly 20,000 times. For 10,000 of these simulations, the Patriots went for it on 4th-on-2. For the other 10,000 simulations, the Patriots punted.

We could look at this simply in terms of what chance the Colts had to drive down the field and score, depending on whether or not the Patriots punted. However, that doesn't take into account all of the things that can happen during a football game. For example, in some of the simulations when the Patriots went for it, the Colts got an interception return for a touchdown. This gave Indy the lead, but also gave Brady two minutes to drive down the field for a game-winning field goal. Similarly, the "safe" choice to punt sometimes resulted in a blocked punt and an instant touchdown for the Colts.

Thus, the only way to accurately find the best call is to simulate the exact game situation thousands of times, taking into account all of the different possible results that can happen in an NFL game.

The verdict: Belichick made the right call.

Breaking down the numbers, we see that when the Patriots went for it, they got the first down in 55.2% of all the simulations. After the first down, they won the game 94.3% of the time (the Colts' one timeout gives them the chance to get the ball back and still score a last-second touchdown, which they were able to do about 1 time in 20, even when the Patriots got the first down).

When the Patriots went for it and didn't convert, the Colts won the game 76.1% of the time. Most of these were because Peyton drove the ball 28 yards for the score. But sometimes the Colts won for another reason. For example, the Colts might score a quick touchdown, leaving Brady enough time to get a winning field goal, but still have enough time to score on the following kickoff return (leading to the Colts winning 42-37).

All-in-all, Belichick's call to go for it gave the Patriots a 62.8% chance of winning the game.

On the flip side, punting the ball only gave the Patriots a 41.3% chance of winning the game. That's right; the Colts won the game 58.7% of the time when the Patriots punted.

So, not only did Belichick make the right call. It wasn't even close. He made the call that increased his team's chance of winning by more than 50% (from 41.3% to 62.8%).

The End Of The 50-Yard Field Goal

Stephen Gostkowski, the kicker for the New England Patriots, has one of the strongest legs in the NFL. Most of his kickoffs go into the opponent's end zone -- many of them for touchbacks.

But he doesn't have any 50-yard field goals this year. That's because Coach Belichick hasn't asked him to try any. Gostkowski has a 93% success rate on kicks less than 50 yards. But no attempts beyond that distance.

This stat is part of a larger trend in the NFL.

In 1994, the NFL changed the rules for missed field goals, so that the team taking possession got the ball at the point of the kick -- not at the previous line of scrimmage. This is only a 7-yard difference. But it's enough to shift the odds away from the decision to try long field goals.

This rule helped create a "no man's land" near the opponent's 35-yard line. On 4th down, it doesn't make sense to punt from within 40 yards of the end zone -- there's a good chance you'll kick too far and end up with a touchback, and a net gain of only 15-20 yards.

But a field goal attempt doesn't make much sense either. Let's assume the average kicker has a 50% success rate on 52-yard field goal attempt (this is a kick from the opponent's 35-yard line). Half the time, you get 3 points. The other half of the time, the other team gets the ball with good field position -- at their own 42-yard line. Getting the ball at your 42-yard line is worth, on average, about 1.8 points.

So, half the time you get 3 points; but the rest of the time you lose 1.8 points. This means that a field goal attempt from the opponent's 35-yard line is worth less than a point (0.6 to be more exact).

By contrast, having the ball at your opponent's 30-yard line is worth about 4 points. So even if you have less than a 50% chance of getting the 1st down, it frequently makes sense to go for it instead of trying to kick the field goal.

Although kickers continue to get stronger and more accurate, we'll see fewer and fewer long field goals as more coaches continue to realize that 50-yard field goal attempts are bad bets.

Did Bill Belichick Use the "Maddux Gambit" Against Tony Dungy?

This weekend, we will see the third post-season matchup between Tom Brady's New England Patriots and Peyton Manning's Indianapolis Colts. As my fellow New Englanders know, the Patriots have won the previous two games. At least some of the credit for these two wins was given to Belichick for "outcoaching" Tony Dungy in both meetings. But when the Pats and Colts played in Foxboro during the regular season this year, it looked like Dungy was doing the "outcoaching".

Even though the Patriots were having success running the ball up the middle, Belichick chose to try some tricky plays, such as a reverse that was stopped for a big loss, and a delayed draw that had Brady and Faulk tripping over each other in the backfield. The Patriots lost 27-20.

At the time, I was baffled by Belichick's play-calling -- a bit like when Grady Little left Pedro Martinez on the mound to start the 8th inning in Game 7 of the 2003 ALCS. It seemed like Belichick was more worried about trying different plays than about winning the game. And then I wondered if Belichick was actually willing to lose during the regular season if it created an advantage that the Patriots could use if they met the Colts again in the playoffs.

Of course, this is ridiculous. The example above of the Maddux Gambit was when Greg Maddux was winning 8-0. Why would Belichick be so crazy as to use the Maddux Gambit in a game that decided home-field advantage in the playoffs?

When you think about it, there are several reasons that Belichick might play the game this way.

1) He wanted to "save" his best plays. This is the primary argument for the "Maddux Gambit" at work. Belichick gave up an advantage during the regular-season game so that he would still have an advantage in this area if the teams met again. In the first three quarters of the game against Indy, Corey Dillon rushed up the middle six times for gains of 4, 4, 7, 9, 9, and 10 yards. In short, they had found a play that worked consistently against the Colts defense (if I remember correctly, most of these plays involved trap blocking by the Tight End or Guard). But when the 4th quarter started, Brady went to the air and the trick plays came out, even though the Pats were only down by 4 points.

The Pats ran Dillon up the middle enough to learn that it was effective, but not enough to win the game. If Bill had kept calling this play in the 4th quarter, they could have driven for a game-winning score, but they also create more film for Dungy and the Colts staff to study. If you assume instead that Bill's primary goal wasn't to win the game, but to use the game as a practice session where he found the Colts' weaknesses, then it makes sense to stop calling this play before the Colts see it enough to figure out how to defeat it.

2) He used the game as a scrimmage. The best way to see how a team will respond to a play (or defensive scheme) is to use it in actual game against them. It's possible that some of the trick plays weren't intended to win the game, but simply to test the Indianapolis defense in case he needed to use these plays at a later time.

3) He didn't want to spoil the Colts undefeated record. Last season, the media spent much of the season talking about the Colts matching the feat of the 1973 Dolphins and playing a "perfect season". Peyton Manning has never even played in a Super Bowl, but the media was assuming the Colts were good enough to not only win the Super Bowl, but also finish 16-0. As it turns out, the Colts not only lost a couple of regular-season games, they didn't even make it to the AFC Championship Game. An undefeated record can distract a team more than it helps them, and Belichick knows that.

4) He didn't want home-field advantage. The Patriots were 7-1 on the road this year, and only 5-3 at home. The Patriots players have been quoted as saying there are fewer distractions on the road; you go straight from your hotel to the game.

5) He wanted to create a psychological advantage. Beating a team builds confidence. But losing by only a touchdown when your QB throws 4 picks and your coaches are making unorthodox play calls. I wouldn't be surprised if Bill sits down with his team this week and admits that he got "cute" with the play-calling in Week 9, and assures them that he learned a lot from his experimentation and now he has a complete plan to pick apart the Colts and go to Super Bowl XLI.

I'm not saying Belichick threw the November game. But it's not the craziest idea that winning a single game in Week 9 wasn't his only goal that day.