Fixing Overtime In The NFL (Revisited)

We already have a great solution to the problem of the coin flip in overtime games. Nevertheless, it has been almost four years, and we're still stuck with the old system.

After the Vikings-Saints NFC Championship game (and the Colts' failed attempt to go 16-0) the argument for this change to the rules is even more compelling. If this rule had been implemented, both the Saints and the Colts would have still had something to play for in the last month of the season.

To summarize, we can fix the following two problems with one rule change:

1) The coin-flip winner has an unfair advantage in overtime.
2) Teams like the 13-0 Saints and 14-0 Colts have no incentive to win after they have clinched the top playoff spot.

The solution is elegantly simple: automatically award the coin flip to the home team.

In addition to eliminating the coin flip, there are a number of other positive effects:

1) This increases the importance of home field advantage in the playoffs. If a team like the Colts go 14-2, they get an edge if a playoff game goes to overtime (just as the home team in baseball has a strategic advantage).

2) We now know who the "home team" is in the Super Bowl. And it matters. This would have been pivotal this season: the Colts and Saints would continue to play hard, knowing that if they met in the Super Bowl, home-field advantage would be determined by their regular-season record. Instead, we got five unwatchable games by two teams that had nothing to play for.

3) It adds drama to the final minutes of a game, and clarifies strategy for coaches. If you're the away team, and you're up against a good offense, you want to play for the win, not the tie, in any last-minute play calls. You go for two if you have the chance. And you go for the touchdown instead of the field goal on 4th down. More excitement, and less overtime (which tends to run into the next game, which doesn't make most football fans happy).

4) It increases attendance. As the NFL becomes more fun to watch on TV, ticket sales are suffering. Giving the home team a bigger advantage increases the likelihood that a home-team fan will have a great experience at the stadium (by getting to see his or her team win).

Wes Welker For MVP

Photo by Mike Gil 

Peyton Manning was announced two days ago as the MVP for the 2009 NFL season. But yesterday, without even leaving Bob Kraft's luxury box, Wes Welker proved that he was the one who should have received the award.

With Welker on the roster, the Pats were 7-0 at home this season. Without Welker, they lost in Foxboro to the Ravens, 33-14. It seems silly to pin a 19-point loss on an injury to one guy. But the evidence shows that Wes Welker turns Tom Brady from a "very good" quarterback into "the best quarterback ever".

Brady's career Passer Rating with Welker: 108.1. That's easily the best Passer Rating ever. It's not even close. According to Football Mogul, Steve Young has a career Passer Rating of 96.8. Peyton Manning and his vaunted four MVPs: just 95.2. Take Welker away from Brady and his career Passer Rating drops to 88.7, more than two points behind Chad Pennington!

The difference is just as stark in the playoffs. Brady's Passer Rating in playoff games with Welker is 97.1, including an amazing 70.6% overall completion rate. Without Welker, Brady's playoff Passer Rating is a mediocre 83.2. And the icing on this shit cake is a 49.1 Passer Rating in Sunday's game versus the Ravens.

Julian Edelman caught two touchdowns in Brady's first home playoff loss. But he didn't move the chains like Welker. And he didn't free up Moss to go deep. Brady spent a lot of time holding the ball and getting pressured, because he didn't have Wes to go to when he needed to.

For some final perspective, note that Matt Cassel's season with the Patriots (and with Welker) in 2008 was better than four of Brady's seasons without Welker. But it was worse than the seasons that Brady has had with Welker. So, Brady is better than Cassel. But Wes is better than both of them.

So, my vote for 2009 NFL MVP goes to Wesley Carter Welker. Without Wes, the Patriots may not have even made the playoffs this year. Tell Peyton to give back that trophy!

Coke Is It! Three In A Row

We can now be fairly confident that the United States has elected three consecutive presidents that have used cocaine.

Maybe this isn't a big deal. In theory, personal experience with illegal drugs should aid in understanding and fixing the drug problem in America (although it is worth noting that Clinton and Bush 34 did little to change the status quo).

The interesting thing is that the U.N. says 7.6% of American adults have tried cocaine. This means that if you picked 3 adults at random from the U.S. population, the chance of all three having tried cocaine is about 1 in 2300. Three presidents is a small sample size, but those odds are long enough that's it's fair to acknowledge the positive correlation between cocaine use and presidency.
The odds of electing 10 male presidents in a row, if presidents were picked at random from the population, is about 1 in 1000. Of course, we all know that there is a causal connection between gender and political success, so that doesn't surprise us. But the cocaine use is surprising. We certainly have enough evidence to think there is a connection between cocaine use and being elected as leader of the "free world". I have a couple ideas:

1) Politics is tough work, and participants feel they need strong stimulants to survive the physical and emotional toll.

2) Presidential races attract "alpha" personalities. People who are cocky and overconfident -- enough to think that they can use cocaine without getting addicted. Cocaine also has a "brand identity" that matches people with these kinds of personalities.

I prefer theory #2. However, I'm not sure how to test it.

Belichick Made The Right Call

Photo by Keith Allison

Last night, near the end of an important game against the Indianapolis Colts in Week 10, the New England Patriots faced 4th-and-2 on their own 28-yard-line. The Patriots were ahead by 6 points, with 2 minutes and 8 seconds left on the clock. Conventional wisdom said the Patriots should punt the ball, to force Manning to try to drive the length of the field for a game-winning score. Instead, the Patriots went for it and failed to convert. The Colts went on to win.

Commentators are already arguing about whether Coach Belichick showed too little faith in his defense, or too much faith in his offense. It has nothing do with faith. It's all about giving your team the best chance of winning. And the numbers say that Belichick made the right call.

To assess whether Belichick chose wisely, I used Football Mogul to simulate the situation that the Patriots faced. Football Mogul had access to every detail of the game, including current rosters and playbooks for each team. It even takes into account the weather and wind, and the fatigue level of the New England defense.

Specifically, I simulated the remainder of the game exactly 20,000 times. For 10,000 of these simulations, the Patriots went for it on 4th-on-2. For the other 10,000 simulations, the Patriots punted.

We could look at this simply in terms of what chance the Colts had to drive down the field and score, depending on whether or not the Patriots punted. However, that doesn't take into account all of the things that can happen during a football game. For example, in some of the simulations when the Patriots went for it, the Colts got an interception return for a touchdown. This gave Indy the lead, but also gave Brady two minutes to drive down the field for a game-winning field goal. Similarly, the "safe" choice to punt sometimes resulted in a blocked punt and an instant touchdown for the Colts.

Thus, the only way to accurately find the best call is to simulate the exact game situation thousands of times, taking into account all of the different possible results that can happen in an NFL game.

The verdict: Belichick made the right call.

Breaking down the numbers, we see that when the Patriots went for it, they got the first down in 55.2% of all the simulations. After the first down, they won the game 94.3% of the time (the Colts' one timeout gives them the chance to get the ball back and still score a last-second touchdown, which they were able to do about 1 time in 20, even when the Patriots got the first down).

When the Patriots went for it and didn't convert, the Colts won the game 76.1% of the time. Most of these were because Peyton drove the ball 28 yards for the score. But sometimes the Colts won for another reason. For example, the Colts might score a quick touchdown, leaving Brady enough time to get a winning field goal, but still have enough time to score on the following kickoff return (leading to the Colts winning 42-37).

All-in-all, Belichick's call to go for it gave the Patriots a 62.8% chance of winning the game.

On the flip side, punting the ball only gave the Patriots a 41.3% chance of winning the game. That's right; the Colts won the game 58.7% of the time when the Patriots punted.

So, not only did Belichick make the right call. It wasn't even close. He made the call that increased his team's chance of winning by more than 50% (from 41.3% to 62.8%).

The End Of The 50-Yard Field Goal

Stephen Gostkowski, the kicker for the New England Patriots, has one of the strongest legs in the NFL. Most of his kickoffs go into the opponent's end zone -- many of them for touchbacks.

But he doesn't have any 50-yard field goals this year. That's because Coach Belichick hasn't asked him to try any. Gostkowski has a 93% success rate on kicks less than 50 yards. But no attempts beyond that distance.

This stat is part of a larger trend in the NFL.

In 1994, the NFL changed the rules for missed field goals, so that the team taking possession got the ball at the point of the kick -- not at the previous line of scrimmage. This is only a 7-yard difference. But it's enough to shift the odds away from the decision to try long field goals.

This rule helped create a "no man's land" near the opponent's 35-yard line. On 4th down, it doesn't make sense to punt from within 40 yards of the end zone -- there's a good chance you'll kick too far and end up with a touchback, and a net gain of only 15-20 yards.

But a field goal attempt doesn't make much sense either. Let's assume the average kicker has a 50% success rate on 52-yard field goal attempt (this is a kick from the opponent's 35-yard line). Half the time, you get 3 points. The other half of the time, the other team gets the ball with good field position -- at their own 42-yard line. Getting the ball at your 42-yard line is worth, on average, about 1.8 points.

So, half the time you get 3 points; but the rest of the time you lose 1.8 points. This means that a field goal attempt from the opponent's 35-yard line is worth less than a point (0.6 to be more exact).

By contrast, having the ball at your opponent's 30-yard line is worth about 4 points. So even if you have less than a 50% chance of getting the 1st down, it frequently makes sense to go for it instead of trying to kick the field goal.

Although kickers continue to get stronger and more accurate, we'll see fewer and fewer long field goals as more coaches continue to realize that 50-yard field goal attempts are bad bets.

Cliff Lee For MVP?

Photo by aturkus on flickr

Cliff Lee is now 14-2 for an Indians team that has won only 45 games. Lee has over 31% of his team's wins.

The last pitcher to finish the season with more than 30% of his team's wins was Fergie Jenkins, winning 25 games for the 1974 Texas Rangers. And Jenkins pitched in a 4-man rotation, allowing him to get 41 starts.

In other words, no pitcher has ever done what Cliff Lee is doing: winning 30% of his team's games while pitching in a 5-man rotation.

Over-Active Game Design

Photo by Bari D

It's not surprising that everybody wants to be a game designer. What's bad is that everyone thinks they can be a good game designer.

Probably the most telling aspect of bad game design is "over-active" game design: the desire to "improve" games by adding complexity.

The media response to tonight's All Star Game is a perfect example of over-active game design. Some suggestions I've heard on T.V. and radio:

1. Anyone who pitched on Sunday should be banned from the All-Star Game.
2. The All-Star rosters should be even bigger (as if 32 players per team weren't enough).
3. Starting pitchers should be required to stay in for 4 innings.
4. Pitchers should be allowed to go back in the game, even if they were already used.
5. All pitchers on the Mets and Yankees (since they are probably already in New York) should have been available to pitch.
6. In extra innings, award a run for every hit.

All of these ideas are dumb: examples of fans thinking they can "fix" a game system by adding more rules.

Of course, the worst ever example of bad game design at the All Star Game was when Bud Selig stood up and declared a "tie" in 2002. He actually changed the rules of the game -- in the middle of the game!

Can you imagine the NFL Commissioner changing the rules for overtime of the Super Bowl?

"I just decided that for this overtime, you only need 5 yards for a first down. I know it's weird, but I'd like the game to end sooner."

It's absurd. But it's not as bad as what Selig did in 2002. Not only did he change the rules in the middle of the game, but he called a premature stop to an exciting extra-inning game. It was horrible game design and horrible showmanship, rolled together into one burrito of suck.

By now, you probably want to know what I think we should do about the problem of extra-inning All Star Games.

The answer: nothing.

When you run out of pitchers, let the position players pitch. It happens several times each year, in games that actually count. Which of the following would be more interesting to watch as a fan?

1) David Wright takes the mound in the bottom of the 16th. He gets the first two batters out but then gives up a walk-off homer to J.D. Drew.

2) Bud Selig waddles onto the field and declares a tie.

It's a no-brainer. Keep it simple. And stop trying to add rules where they aren't needed.